Practicalities

**Wifi** (available from 26.10.2017 8:00 until 27.10.2017 20:00):

name: BSEMP2
password: personalidentity

Eduroam is also available

**Cash and payment**

The currency in Hungary is Hungarian Forints (HUF): 1000 HUF are approx. 3.2 EUR and 3.8 USD. You can withdraw money in HUF at ATMs widely available in the city, including at the airport and train stations. Alternatively, you can change money, in which case it is advisable not to change on the airport or at the train stations, but do it in the city where rates are better. Anyhow, you won’t need too much cash, since in most of the places credit cards are accepted.

If you go to a bar or a restaurant with table service, 10% tip is usually the norm which can be included in credit card payments as well. If there is no table service, a small tip (approx. 50-100 HUF) is still a nicety.

**Arrival by plane**

For the taxi register at the booth outside the terminal. You can pay in the taxi by credit card or cash (approx. 25EUR to Astoria). You can also use the public transportation.

**Arrival by train**

By train probably you will arrive either at Déli pályaudvar (southern railway station), or Keleti pályaudvar (eastern railway station), both of which are located on underground line M2 which also calls at Astoria where the conference venue is located.

Do not use taxis waiting outside of these stations which do not visibly belong to one of the major taxi companies, which you can recognize from the logo and the sign of the taxi!
Using taxi in Budapest

Every legal taxi uses the same fares in Budapest (approx. 5-10 EUR for one ride within the inner city) and you can pay in every taxi by cash or credit card. Uber and other ride sharing apps are illegal.

Since Főtaxi has the largest fleet of cars, it is recommended to use their service which you can order either by phone (+3612222222) or by application (http://fotaxi.hu/taxirendelo-aplikacio/#)

You should never use a “private” taxi that does not belong to one of the major taxi companies, which you can recognize from the logo and the sign of the taxi.

The logos of major taxi companies:
Public transportation

The public transportation is relatively cheap and reliable. You can buy tickets and passes from vending machines widely available throughout the city. It looks like this:

Your options are either single tickets (approx. 1 EUR), or a 72 hours unlimited pass (approx. 15 EUR). The full list of tickets available can be found here http://www.bkk.hu/en/tickets-and-passes/prices/. Also, the company has an excellent application available in English as well (search for “BKK Futár” in Android store or AppStore).

Cash machines near the conference venue
Emergency and safety

Oliver’s number: +36205204880
Ákos’s number: +36709676677
General emergency number (“911”): 112
Police: 107
Ambulance: 104

Budapest is generally safe, especially the inner city, but use some common sense measures against pick pockets.
Venues

Location of the keynote addresses and panels (wheelchair accessible):

Eötvös Loránd University, Institute of Philosophy
1088 Budapest, Múzeum körút 4/i


There is also a Bubi (bicycle for rent) docking station in front of the university

Location of the conference dinner (wheelchair accessible):

XO Bistro
1088 Budapest, Rákóczi út 5.
Abstracts

Udo Thiel (Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz): Materialist and Transcendental Conceptions of the Self: Priestley and Kant

Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason that both materialism and spiritualism are „incapable“ of „explaining my existence“(B 420). In the literature on Kant, his arguments against materialism are typically referred to as a “refutation”, suggesting an analogy between his critique of materialism and his “Refutation of Idealism” (B 274-5). This talk argues that Kant’s relation to (psychological) materialism is more complex than is usually thought, and it evaluates this relation in a new and more positive light. In contrast to the existing literature on Kant and materialism, this paper takes into account actual eighteenth-century materialist positions and arguments with which Kant was familiar. In particular, we will look at Joseph Priestley, one of the most important materialist thinkers in the second half of the eighteenth century. Indeed, we will argue that Priestley anticipates some of Kant’s arguments against rationalist psychology. Moreover, we will argue, against a very commonly held view, that Kant’s rejection of materialism does not commit him to an immaterialist metaphysics of the soul. These arguments involve a discussion of the problem of the unity of consciousness and of notions such as simplicity and identity.

Ruth Boeker (University College Dublin): Locke on Personal Identity, Transitivity, and Divine Justice

Locke’s account personal identity in terms of same consciousness has been repeatedly criticized for failing to satisfy the transitivity of identity. The objection goes that consciousness is not a transitive relation, and thus Locke’s account of personal identity should be rejected or revised. Thiel regards it as a “serious weakness” that Locke does not have a satisfying response to the transitivity objection. I will challenge Thiel’s interpretation and believe that Thiel too quickly puts attempts to resolve the problem of transitivity in the context of the Day of Judgement aside.

My contributions are fourfold:

First, I give credit to Stuart’s and Strawson’s non-transitive interpretations, who emphasize that Locke’s view fundamentally concerns questions of moral
accountability. Based on the insights of their interpretations I develop a list of constraints that any good interpretation of Locke should satisfy.

Second, I identify problems for Stuart’s and Stawson’s interpretations. I argue that Stuart fails to take seriously that Locke’s view is directed towards a divine Last Judgement and that Strawson leaves too much room for moral luck.

Third, I develop my own hybrid interpretation, which combines transitive and non-transitive elements. I argue that in order to avoid the problem of moral luck, God will have to play an active role at the Day of Judgement and make resurrected persons conscious of their past thoughts and actions. To do so, God will need an objective criterion. I argue that any non-transitive criterion conflicts with considerations of divine justice. This makes it plausible that God will use a transitive criterion to make resurrected persons conscious of their past. I show how God’s criterion is grounded in Locke’s account of same consciousness, which is richer than Stuart’s memory interpretation. God’s active involvement at the resurrection ensures the presence of direct consciousness connections to all the thoughts and actions for which a person is held accountable. Thereby my interpretation satisfies the constraints developed in part one.

Fourth, I discuss whether Locke’s theory leaves room for repentance. Strawson suggested that it should, but Thiel objected that Locke’s theory entails that despite genuine repentance a person would have to be punished for past crimes. Based on a manuscript note and passages from Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity, I argue that Locke would want to accommodate repentance. I show that Thiel’s interpretation is based on a questionable assumption and explain why my hybrid interpretation is better suited to take repentance seriously than Strawson’s non-transitive interpretation.

**Ville Paukkonen (University of Helsinki): Berkeley, Consciousness and the Self**

In this paper I aim to shed some light on Berkeley’s view of the self by concentrating on the concept of consciousness as it occurs in the writings of Berkeley. Although I will argue that in the end, consciousness is not a helpful way of characterizing the Berkeleyan self, reaching this negative result will in itself be worthwhile for, besides being contrary to several extremely influential readings of Berkeley and self (Atherton 1983; Bettcher 2007), it will enable us to gain a better understanding of Berkeley’s theory of the self and the knowledge we can hope to attain concerning the self.
Berkeley seemed to have understood consciousness in broadly similar terms as Malebranche. In fact, the very last entry of Notebooks is a critique of mind being known via consciousness, where the distinction between mind and consciousness is said to be “a vain distinction” (NB 888), leaving open whether the mind and consciousness are indistinguishable or whether knowing via consciousness as knowing through feeling is claimed to be, falsely, distinguished from knowing through ideas. I will be claiming that the intention of NB 888 is the latter one.

The concept of consciousness as used by Berkeley seems to be basically in full accord with what both Malebranche and Locke meant by consciousness. In Berkeley’s case, the rejection of the relevance of this kind of consciousness for our self-knowledge, or even as a defining feature of what it is to be a mind, is relevant. It signals a break from certain major early modern theories of the mind, or at least some interpretations of them, by putting emphasis less on the qualitative feeling that accompanies thinking or experiencing and more on the volitionally active component of effort of trying.

The main reasons for rejecting the consciousness-centered reading of Berkeley’s philosophy of mind are threefold. First, Berkeley’s unequivocal rejection of the Lockean continuity of consciousness account of personal identity in Alciphron, that precedes Reid, would become mysterious were Berkeley to accept a somewhat Lockean theory of consciousness. Secondly, and more importantly, were Berkeley’s account of mind build around the concept of consciousness, it would be mysterious how Berkeley could avoid the so-called bundle-theory of the self, which was something he definitively felt able to do. Were mind to be accounted for merely on basis of consciousness, then, given Berkeley’s fundamental assumption that all ideas are perceived, the most natural reading of mind, or self for that matter, for Berkeley would be entirely in terms of ideas, which is something that Berkeley empathetically rejects. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, were consciousness the defining feature of the self for Berkeley, self-knowledge would become extremely easy: mere attendance of a certain feature of our ideas, consciousness about them, would suffice for self-knowledge. However, self-knowledge for Berkeley is directed at features that do not seem to be fully captured in terms of consciousness, our active strivings as opposed to mere passive undergoing of perceptions, and thus seems to involve an aspect of achievement, as opposed to mere undergoing, as it’s essential component.
Peter West (Trinity College Dublin): Knowing Me, Knowing You: Berkeley on Self-Knowledge

Famously for Berkeley, a thing’s esse is *perципi* or *perципere* (‘to be’ is either ‘to be perceived’ or to ‘perceive’): all existing entities are either minds or ideas. Berkeley tells us that we can gain knowledge of our ideas by simply attending to the sensible qualities we perceive. However, he makes it explicitly clear that it is not possible to gain knowledge of minds, “by way of ideas”. Hence, Berkeley needs an alternative account of how we gain knowledge of the mind.

Self-knowledge plays an especially important role for Berkeley: he claims that we use the immediate knowledge we have of our own mind as a representation (an “image or idea”) of other minds. But how do we gain knowledge of ourselves in the first place if not by means of ideas? Two interpretations have been suggested; Jonathan Bennett’s ‘negative account’ states that we infer the existence of our own mind from the fact that we perceive ideas, and the fact that anything that perceives ideas is, by definition, a spirit. Talia Mae Bettcher’s ‘non-perceptual account’ offers a more affirmative reading in which self-knowledge is a kind of non-perceptual awareness that one exists. I argue that both readings fail to take into account Berkeley’s strictly empirical approach to knowledge. Furthermore, it’s not clear how the above kinds of self-‘knowledge’ could act as representations of other minds.

In many ways, Berkeley is like a direct realist, interested in “immediate data” (as Russell put it) and hesitant of the risks of ‘abstraction’. In the case of sensible objects, Berkeley argues that their existence consists in our perceiving determine sensible qualities (e.g. the colour, shape, taste of this apple). In line with Berkeley’s strict empiricism, I argue that we should look for a parallel in the case of the self – that is, we should look for ‘immediate data’. As it happens, such data are identified in the *Principles* (1710). Berkeley identifies two features of the mind: the will and the understanding – each of which has separate roles to play in relation to our perception of the sensible world. Roughly, the understanding is what ‘receives’ ideas while the will is what ‘affects’ them. As I take, Berkeley’s view is the by attending to these distinctive features of the mind, we can gain empirical and, crucially, immediate knowledge of ourselves. As such, Berkeley does outline the immediate data that are necessary and sufficient for self-knowledge.
Ádám Smrcz (Institute of Philosophy, HAS / Eötvös Loránd University): Corporeal Memory and Individuation from Baconian and Platonist Perspectives

The question of how matter individuates substances had been a crucial one long before the early modern period as well, but with the emergence of Cartesianism and its novel implications on the nature of matter, a new impetus was given to these longstanding debates. As it turned out, the modifications of matter could be held responsible for much more operations, than it was previously held (as e.g. the Cartesian parable of the harp player might reveal), and thus, these modifications became subject of eager scientific investigation.

Besides Cartesianism, the early modern period also saw the emergence of a group of such „eclectic“ thinkers, who intended to synthetise the newly established concept of matter with the methods of Baconian sciences along with certain premises of Platonism. In my talk, I intend to highlight two such examples: that of Edward Herbert of Cherbury and of Jean Baptiste du Hamel. Herbert is mostly regarded as the forerunner of Cambridge Platonism, but his contemporaries regarded him as a follower of Bacon (Gassendi even called him the „new Verulamius“), and earlier scholarship also interpreted him in the latter framework (but – according to my claim – both classifications can be justified in some manner). At the same time, du Hamel expressly endorses both Baconian and Platonist views. Both thinkers (1.) denied that the nature of the things observed would be transmitted to our minds, and thus (2.) careful observation of things is needed in order to create proper notions or propositional claims. But (3.) in a causally independent way from the previous mechanism, one is also endowed with the capacity to grasp claims intuitively – something Bacon would never have approved of.

However, their standpoint is entirely different: Herbert (almost) exclusively confines himself to the field of epistemology, while du Hamel’s dissertations mostly concern physics and metaphysics. Herbert claims that propositions not verified by intellectually concieved „common notions“ can not be considered as necessary true, but – even more importantly from the present perspective – will result in the individualisation of a person. Du Hamel – accordingly, but from an entirely other perspective – attributes this phenomenon the peculiar way one’s corporeal substance is affected, thus: to corporeal memory.
Przemysław Gut (The John Paul II (The Second) Catholic University of Lublin): Leibniz: Personal Identity and Sameness of Substance

Leibniz’s theory of personal identity has been the object of numerous discussions and various interpretations. In the paper I contrast my view on Leibniz’s solution to the problem of personal identity with the view of Margaret Wilson and Samuel Scheffler. They both claimed that Leibniz failed to formulate a coherent, uniform and tenable theory of personal identity. His stance – as they state – contains so many inconsistencies that it cannot be adopted as a satisfactory solution to this problem. I disagree with this opinion. It is my conviction that a more inquisitive analysis of Leibniz’s texts leads to the conclusion that such severe criticism of the results of Leibniz’s studies of personal identity is ill-founded. My paper consists of two parts. In the first part – drawing on suggestions made by Vailati, Thiel, Noonan, and Bobro – I attempt to present the essential arguments against the interpretation offered by M. Wilson and S. Scheffler. In the second part I address two issues. First, I try to discuss the reasons which Leibniz listed to support his thesis that personal identity requires both the continuity of substance and the continuity of some psychological phenomena. Then, I turn to identifying Leibniz’s arguments which support the thesis that what ultimately provides a person with identity is their substantial principle, i.e. the soul or “I”.


One of the most important early modern discussions concerning personal identity, namely between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins, has its immediate source in a very controversial publication by Henry Dodwell concerning the soul’s immortality. Dodwell held a ‘mortalist’ view, namely that the soul is naturally mortal, and only souls with proper knowledge of the gospel are immortalized by God for reward or punishment. Dodwell’s work is notable as being the first defense of mortalism by an orthodox theologian. Along with Clarke, John Norris (1657-1711) was one of the most important and immediate critics of Dodwell. Norris, one of the most widely read early modern philosophers during his lifetime and for many decades after he died (as the famous early modern English bookseller John Dunton said, “he can turn Metaphysics
into Money”), is an unfortunately neglected and largely unknown figure today, generally uncharitably cast aside as the mere “English Malebranche”. However, Norris is a far more original thinker than he is given credit for. Norris believed that there is a real distinction between soul and body, and that the self is to be located in the soul and not the body. For Norris, I contend, a proper consideration of the self is intimately connected with a careful discussion of the soul’s natural immortality, contra Dodwell.

My aim in this paper is to draw together Norris’s discussion of the real distinction of the soul and body with his account of the immortality of the soul. Norris thinks that if Locke is right about the possibility of thinking matter, then it would be impossible to show that the soul is separate from the body or that the soul is immaterial, and naturally immortal. One might, like Dodwell, hold that the soul is immortal merely in virtue of a positive decree of God, but on Locke’s terms one simply can not show that the soul is not by its very nature mortal, and likewise a corruptible thing. However, this position, Norris thinks, has grave moral consequences. The crux of Norris’s first publication against Dodwell in 1708 is to properly state the question of what it means for the soul to be immortal in the first place by distinguishing what is ‘natural’ from what is ‘positive’, something Norris thinks has unfortunately been neglected in the history of philosophy. Responding to Dodwell’s criticisms of his publication the following year, however, Norris’s aim takes a turn towards a demonstration of the soul’s immateriality and natural immortality, which he strictly avoided doing in the initial response to Dodwell. Throughout Norris’s writings, he explicitly aligns himself with the Malebranchean view that we have no clear idea of the essence of the soul, and in light of this he argues for the real distinction of the soul and body by appealing to the essence of matter as extended being. Nevertheless, I hold that Norris’s late works on the immortality of the soul suggest that we have a more direct means of knowing the essence of the soul than the Malebranchean position allows.

Botond Csuka (Eötvös Loránd University/University of Physical Education):
‘Nervous’ Selves: Sensibility and Self-Fashioning in Eighteenth-Century Britain

The paper addresses the question of self-fashioning in eighteenth-century Britain by analyzing the “refined [bodily] code of nervousness” (G.S. Rousseau) produced partly in medical and physiological texts that contributed to the discourse of sensibility. Even though the key concept of sensibility, encompassing moral, aesthetic and literary dimensions, came to dominate debates on these issues from the 1740s, George S.
Rousseau famously argued that its origins lie in the scientific model of Locke’s theory of sensation, the work of his teacher, Thomas Willis’ 1664 Cerebri anatome, thus pointing out the discursive interpenetration of philosophy, neurophysiology and medicine. With the rise of sensibility, argues Stephen Gaukroger, natural philosophy (and medicine in particular) “emerged as a general cognitive model”. For Locke, sensibility is not only a precondition of our cognitive relation to our environments, but it is also a key constituent of our self-awareness.

But the scope of the concept of sensibility is broader than this: the discourse built upon it, many argue, produced the new idea of “nervous man”, a “nervous model of the self”, a self that is composed of nerves, spirits and fibres – a vibrating network endowing consciousness with delicate susceptibility to impressions from its “outer” and “inner” environment and attributing our cognitive, affective and sensory operations to our nervous apparatus. This new sense of self unfolded due to the joined enterprise of neurophysiology and medical treatises on neurological maladies, the sensationalist analyses of the production of consciousness, theories of moral and aesthetic sentimentalism, and, needless to say, novels of sensibility cultivating and articulating inner experience. Perceptive intellectual historians like Rousseau argue that this model also offered a guide to self-fashioning, a code embodied in bodily movements, postures, gestures, various expressions of affection – signs of a delicate nervous constitution.

After delineating the complex discoursive and conceptual terrain of sensibility, the paper investigates how the neurophysiological and medical components of this discourse like Dr. Cheyne’s The English Malady (1733) or Robert Whytt’s famous theory of sensibility (1751) contributed to the constitution of this ambiguous code, and thus to the conception of the nervous model of the self and the fashioning anew of modern selves. Self-fashioning, the paper argues, is more than a mere presentation of the self in a socially acceptable manner – it also embraces the transformation of how one relates to one’s embodied self.
Early 20th-century critiques of materialism (often assimilated to ‘mechanistic materialism’) frequently emphasized that the materialist conception of the world eradicates any presence of agency, selfhood, intentionality – the features by which a human being, and indeed an animal shows signs that ‘someone is home’, as Daniel Dennett phrased it. According to this critique (which runs roughly from Husserl to Ruyer and Sartre, and onto some versions of post-war anti-naturalism) materialism is at best the facilitator of scientific practice with its quantitative, ‘third-person’ approach to personhood, and at worst a kind of ontological legitimator of dehumanization. As one commentator on Diderot put it, “Materialism as a working philosophy, used as a tool in the scientific investigation of the material universe, is appropriate and highly effective. Intended for the objective analysis and description of the world of externals, it yields disastrous results when applied to the inner, subjective world of human nature, human thought, and human emotions” (Hill 1968, 90). Here the historian of early modern materialism has a word to say, for in contrast to the above views, there were indeed various attempts to bridge the gap between selfhood/agency and the world of Nature and naturalist explanations (and additionally one can see that normative judgments with regard to what constitutes ‘inner life’ versus ‘external nature’ are present also in the ‘scholarly’ mode of writing). I will seek to reconstruct two possible responses to the “disastrous results” challenge, both of which were present in French materialism, and are compatible although independent of one another: (1) a weakly Spinozist position in which absolute privacy is denied and the self is presented as belonging to the world of external relations, such that no one fact, including supposedly private facts, is only accessible to a single person (Deschamps, Diderot); (2) an ‘animalist’ reconstruction of selfhood as a sense of “organic unity” which could be a condition for biological individuality, but also, one which builds on the foundation of animal life (La Mettrie, Diderot). As Diderot wrote in response to a manuscript by the Dutch natural philosopher Franz Hemsterhuis, in 1774: “Grant me that the animal can feel. I will take care of the rest” (Diderot 1975, XXIV, 299).
Vili Lähteenmäki (University of Helsinki): Selves in Descartes

My talk addresses the question of compatibility of the competing conceptions of the self Descartes presents in the *Meditations*. Capturing the notion of person as a real union of mind and body requires for Descartes clear and distinct ideas of both mind and body but the union cannot be inferred from clear and distinct understanding of the nature of either, because those natures are entirely silent about the nature of the “true mode of union” (AT III, 492) of those substances, i.e. the nature of a person.

I will consider the relation between the mind as a mere thinking thing—a “core self” that by the power of God could exists apart from a body—and the union of mind and body—a “full self” (*me totum* (AT VII, 78)) in which a particular mind is dependent on a particular body so as to make a particular moral agent. My talk will address the following questions: Does Descartes mean that the notion of union is primitive (AT III, 665) in a metaphysical sense, i.e. a rudimental entity, or in a scientific/methodological sense, i.e. because of our (restricted) sensory way of knowing the union? Can the full self be identical with the core self, if the latter is an essential element of the former or how do they overlap? Is the full self know clearly and distinctly via unmediated consciousness (as the influential tradition from Ryle to Putnam to Dennett & others has it) or only obscurely “through ordinary course of life” (AT III, 692).

In basic agreement with some recent scholarship I will argue that Cartesian consciousness is not the essence of the mind and that the mind is not transparent to consciousness to the effect that the mind is evidently and infallibly known to itself. Building on this analysis, I aim to provide more clarity not only about the most rudimentary ways we can relate to our self/selves but also the question of primitiveness of the union. As concerns the question of identity/overlap of core and full selves, I will consider the prospect of denying that for Descartes there is a priority of the parts over their union (argued by Brown & Normore (forthcoming)).

Géza Kállay (Eötvös Loránd University) & Tamás Pavlovits (University of Szeged): Pascal and Shakespeare on the Self

Pascal could have known the works of William Shakespeare but, to the best of our knowledge, he did not. What brings the two authors together in our paper is not direct influence but our conviction that a philosophical text, with its conceptual rigour and logic, may offer, on such a many-faced topic as the *self*, useful perspectives for the
textual analysis of a literary piece, while the metaphors and the dramatic structure of a play may have the ability to animate philosophical concepts and to help in rethinking the abstractions and generalisations inhering in their logical construction.

Our paper starts with a brief overview of Pasca’sl conception of the self, the I, who for him is not a strong, constructed ego but an illusion. For Pascal, the core of the self is *l’ amour-propre*, self-love, which wants to make it-self acceptable in society, too. Pascal presents a self who is vain as a consequence of the Fall of Man. One of the symptoms of self-love is the way some people are clad: physicians, lawyers, monarchs put on various robes to hide the emptiness and egotism of the I. The desire to be flattered is but wishing for another disguise to hide the rottenness of the human heart.

At the beginning of Shakespeare’s *King Lear* – to which we are going to restrict ourselves in a short paper – the old monarch divides his kingdom into three parts and asks for “words of love” from his three daughters in exchange. He blatantly disregards that love cannot be measured, and he is all ears for the flattery of his two elder daughters, while he cannot even bear the sight of true but piercingly demanding love radiating from his youngest daughter, Cordelia. The banishment of Cordelia and Kent (the paragon of faithfulness) starts an avalanche of tragedies, in the course of which Lear meets the naked Edgar in the storm, whom Lear considers to be “the thing ['Being'] itself” and he wants to get rid of his “lendings”, i.e. his royal clothes.

Our paper will read the respective texts onto one another and will try to consider how their similarities and differences can mutually point towards aspects which might otherwise remain hidden from interpreters.

**Margaret Matthews (Emory University, Atlanta): The Same Enterprise but Opposite Goals: Rousseau’s Response to Montaigne on Self-Interpretation and Personal Identity**

Rousseau frames his final autobiographical work, the *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, as an explicit response to Montaigne’s *Essays*. Regarding his own project, Rousseau writes: “My enterprise is the same as Montaigne’s, but my goal is the complete opposite of his.” How can Rousseau’s project be the same as Montaigne’s, but his goal be the...

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opposite? My paper attempts to answer this question by examining Rousseau’s comments on self-interpretation throughout the Reveries, and comparing these claims to Montaigne’s comments on self-interpretation throughout the Essays. I will show that while Rousseau shares Montaigne’s views on how to discuss the self, he rejects Montaigne’s views on what the self ultimately is. It is on account of these differing views on personal identity that Montaigne and Rousseau direct their autobiographical projects toward different ends.

The enterprise that both writers share is the project of autobiographical writing understood as a method of self-interpretation and formation. Both philosophers attempt to arrive at self-knowledge through carefully observing and recording all of their cognitive and affective states. Despite this formal similarity, Montaigne and Rousseau direct their projects toward different goals or ends. Montaigne seeks to understand himself so as to understand the world around him whereas Rousseau seeks to understand himself purely for its own sake.

Montaigne and Rousseau’s goals differ because so too do their views on personal identity. On Montaigne’s view, the self is unified through the activity of judgment. The self is mediated by the relations it has with others and with the world around it. On Rousseau’s view, the self is unified through the sentiment d’existence—an immediate feeling that the self has of its own existence. For Rousseau, the unity of the self is immediately given, rather than constituted by the relations it has with the world around it. Since Montaigne’s subject is relationally constituted, the goal of understanding the self is bound up with understanding the world around it. The Essays is a book about the world as much as about Montaigne’s own self. Since Rousseau’s subject is an immediate unity, he views self-interpretation as an end in its own right. It is in this sense that while Montaigne and Rousseau share the same enterprise, they have opposite goals.

Bartosz Zukowski (University of Lodz): Richard Burthogge’s Theory of Mind

The paper focuses on the theory of lesser known English philosopher Richard Burthogge, the author, among other works, of Organum Vetus & Novum (published in 1678), and An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits (published in 1694). Although Burthogge’s ideas had little or no impact on the philosophy of his time, and consequently have, until now, not been the subject of systematic study, one can find
in his writings a very unique theory of idealistic constructivism, anticipating, toutes proportions gardeés, Kantian idealism. At the same time, some intriguing implications can be derived from Burthogge’s account of the mind for his theory of self-interpretation and the self as such. According to Burthogge’s view, the mind can be self-interpreted only indirectly, that is as it manifests itself by its faculties, powers or acts. This claim is followed by a remarkable concept of structural and functional isomorphism of principal cognitive faculties (i.e. reasoning and sensation), considered to be apprehensive, “conceptive” and “cogitative” powers. In Burthogge’s opinion, every act of cognition, intellectual as well as sensational is intentional in nature, that is contains some basic relational structure linking the mind with the object of cognition. The immediate implication of this claim for both subject and object is that they cannot be reduced to a pure stream of sense data, but on the contrary must be considered independent from the content of cognition. Furthermore, each act of human knowledge is also “conceptive”, presenting the external thing under the subjective mode of conceiving, proper for human mind due to its internal structure. As a result, Burthogge clearly anticipates Kantian idealism by claiming that it is impossible to know the external reality in itself, and by situating human consciousness as if in between the equally unknowable external object and subject. The main objective of the proposed paper is the detailed analysis of the latter aspect of his doctrine.

Janum Sethi (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor): Kant on Subjectivity and Self-Consciousness

In this paper, I argue that two key questions concerning Kant’s account of self-consciousness in the Critique of Pure Reason are related, and can be jointly answered. The problems turn on two ways in which Kant draws the distinction between objective and subjective representations. A representation is subjective in the first sense if it lacks objective validity - that is, if it does not claim to represent the world correctly. A representation is subjective in the second sense if it is about the subject, rather than about objects in the external world.

To each sense of subjectivity is attached a question: does Kant have the resources to allow for representations that are genuinely subjective in this way?

The first question arises because Kant argues in the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ that the mere consciousness on the part of a subject that a certain representation is hers
brings with it a claim to objectivity. The worry is that this seems to entail that a subject can never be conscious of any representations that lack this feature and so, are subjective in the first sense. The second question arises because Kant argues in the ‘Paralogisms’ that what is traditionally taken to be substantive consciousness of the self is, in fact, merely formal. This raises the question of whether Kant allows that a subject can genuinely represent herself rather than the external world.

I argue that both these worries can be jointly resolved. Kant makes clear that a combination of representations is genuinely subjective in the first sense if it is the result of psychological associations that a subject finds herself with, rather than the outcome of a rule-governed act of synthesis that she performs. But, as I go on to argue, consciousness of such an associated set of representations is also subjective in the second sense. For through it the subject becomes conscious of what occurs in her own mind rather than in the world: as Kant says in the Anthropology, she becomes “conscious of what [s]he undergoes in so far as [s]he is affected by the play of [her] own thoughts.” (7:161) I conclude my account by explaining how such consciousness forms the basis of the only kind of empirical self-knowledge that Kant thinks is possible: knowledge of the mind as an entity governed by the natural laws of psychology.

Ákos Forczek (Eötvös Loránd University): Apperception and Affinity: Kant on the Identity of the Psychological Person

In my paper I will focus on the link between Kant’s critical conception of personal identity and his principle of transcendental affinity. By means of this principle, introduced in the A Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant refers to the lowest level of the process of sense-bestowal when exploring the different strata of experience. The doctrine of transcendental affinity as a formal and material condition of the possibility of combining the sensory manifold into one representation addresses the issue of the inscrutable genesis of the constitution of a world of objects. Thus, in my talk I will offer a viewpoint from which the main question to be answered is: How does one’s mind have to articulate the world in order for one to be able to consider oneself as a person?

I will proceed as follows. First I will clear up Kant’s distinction between personal identity and identical apperception by summarising his criticism of the rationalist notion of person presented in the Paralogisms chapter of the CPR. After this preliminary
explanation, I will limit my scope to his modest (empirical) concept of person based on the unbroken continuity of one’s cognitive states’ stream in the transcendental unity of apperception (labelled as “psychological personality” in The Metaphysics of Morals).

I will then turn to the scattered occurrences of affinity in the A Deduction, clarifying the notion’s relation a) to the reproducibility and associability of appearances; b) to the transcendental function of imagination; c) to the transcendental object as a correlate of the unity of apperception; and d) to the regulative principles of systematicity as developed in the Appendix to the Dialectic. I will touch upon the debates about whether this tenet violates the boundaries of transcendental idealism.

I will then elaborate the connection between personal identity and uniformity of nature, arguing for the consistency of the (implicit) Kantian position that we are only able to understand ourselves as identical persons if everything that appears to us can be articulated as a possible experience potentially fitting into a systematic (though undetermined) unity of nature.

Finally, I will take a closer look at the so called Ether Deduction of the Opus Postumum, pointing out that a great part of the literary remains of the late Kant can be regarded as a struggle to reformulate the problem in a “post-critical” framework.


In chapter IV of the TTP, Spinoza distinguishes between two kinds of law, one that “depends … on a necessity of nature,” the other “on a human decision” (4.1; III/57). In this paper I consider the relation of these two kinds of law to each other and to the ground of sovereign authority, which is the divine will in the first case, and the human will in the second. On the face of it this doctrine seems to conflict with key passages concerning the will in both Spinoza’s early works and the Ethics. If the faculty of free will is an error, then so is the belief that the decision we make is possible and could have been otherwise. Yet in the TTP he claims that, because we are “completely ignorant of the order and connection of things itself, … for practical purposes it is better, indeed necessary to consider things as possible” (iv.4; III/58). In the context this leads to the conclusion that we treat the second kind of law as if it resulted from a free decision of the human sovereign. I want to call this second conception the “quasi free-will.”
In this paper I argue that, although Spinoza had certainly conceived of both kinds of will before writing the TTP, his view that it is a practical necessity to hold the second view is a change that has consequences for his later work, particularly the structure of the *Ethics*. Not only does the quasi free-will influence his political theory, it also changes his theory of action and the ethics that follows from it. Achieving the highest good is no longer simply a matter of using reason to correct the mistaken notion of the free will and all that follows from it. Instead, we have to recognize that the quasi free-will is itself part of the process of ethical self-improvement.

I show that he uses a concept that his explicit in his early works—a “being of reason” [*entia rationis*]—to make sense of the human will, the sovereign will, and the product of those acts, ethical prescriptions and law. The specific imaginative mechanism that is at the heart of the will and its law is analogy, and this explains both how we go wrong in our decisions but also how we might go right. This account is important, even for actors who are mostly led by reason, because it is an inevitable consequence of our finite nature that we are affected by the imagination and the passions. Although the TTP seems focused on politics and on contingently held religious and historical narratives, Spinoza’s account of the sovereign decisions of the ancient Israelites yields insight into the very mechanisms of the ethical subject.
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